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THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE
James S. Fishkin*

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND JUSTICE: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY. By Michel Rosenfeld. New Haven: y ale
University Press. 1991. Pp. vii, 373. $30.
Two decades into the active revival of liberal political philosophy,
a revival that can be dated from the publication of John Rawls' A
Theory of Justice in 1971, 1 Michel Rosenfeld2 offers an ambitious account of why all the rival approaches are defective and why a proposal
of his own, built around a combination of theories from Lawrence
Kohlberg and Jiirgen Habermas, provides the ultimate solution to the
theory of justice. He then goes on to apply this apparatus to the most
vexing issue of current public debate: affirmative action.
Two main questions arise in attempting to evaluate this work.
First, how adequate is Rosenfeld's theoretical framework compared to
all the rivals he proposes to dispatch? Second, does his theoretical
framework support the position on affirmative action he would have us
adopt?
Rosenfeld divides liberal theories of justice into libertarian, egalitarian, contractarian, and utilitarian approaches. While this classification does succeed in capturing the main alternatives, it is not
intellectually tidy. Contractarian refers to a decision procedure, either
an actual or a hypothetical social contract, employed as an apparatus
of justification. The terms egalitarian, utilitarian, and libertarian refer
to substantive positions rather than to the decision procedure supporting those substantive positions. The difficulty is that prominent examples of substantive positions fall in the egalitarian, utilitarian, or
libertarian categories that are supported by a social contract method
of justification. Hence Rosenfeld's classifications, which organize a
large portion of the discussion, produce more confusion than clarity.
More specifically, Rawls' original position, which bids individuals
to evaluate social institutions from behind a hypothetical veil of ignorance, has become the paradigmatic contractarian .theory. Yet, as
Rawls admits, one can easily deploy a variation of the original position
• Darrell K. Royal Regents Chair in Ethics and American Society, Professor of Government, Law, and Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin. B.A. 1970, Yale College; Ph.D.
(Political Science) 1975, Yale University; Ph.D. (Philosophy) 1976, Cambridge University, England. -Ed.
1. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
2. Professor of Law, Yeshiva University.
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in support of utilitarianism. 3 Would a Harsanyi-style advocate of average utilitarianism (justified by a gambling argument from the original position) fit into the contractarian or the utilitarian category?4
The strategy of justification is contractarian, but the substantive conclusion is obviously utilitarian.
The matter becomes even more confused by Rosenfeld's adoption
of Douglas Rae's categories for understanding the range of "egalitarian" theories. 5 Within Rae's categories, Rawls' "maximin" theory of
justice is a species of equality. 6 Is Rawls' theory then a contractarian
theory because it is based on the original position, or is it an egalitarian theory because it is advocating a form of equality (at least according to the categories adopted by Rosenfeld)? Furthermore, if social
contract theories are characterized by a decision process under actual
or hypothetjcal circumstances, then it is arguable that Robert
Nozick's theory, offered by Rosenfeld as the paradigmatic libertarian
theory, is also properly classified as a social contract theory. Nozick
takes Lockean assumptions to a hypothetical state of nature and shows
how a nonrights-violating decision process in that state of nature
would yield a minimal state. 7 On some grounds, such a libertarian
theory is social contract; in terms of its substantive principles, however, it is libertarian. These categories seem to support classification
of Nozick's theory as both social contract and libertarian, Harsanyi's
theory as both social contract and utilitarian, and Rawls' theory as
both social contract and egalitarian. The truth is that most of the contemporary revival in theories of justice is based, ultimately, on variations of the social contract. To separate egalitarian, utilitarian, and
libertarian approaches from the social contract is simply to cut off substantive positions from the strategy of justification most commonly
used to support them.
Rosenfeld's own proposal is based on "stage six," a decision procedure that he borrows from the late Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg explicitly classifies Rawls' original position as the best example of stage
six. 8 Indeed, Kohlberg says arguments from the original position and
those from stage six are substantively equivalent.9 Yet Rawls' original
3. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 12, 163-65.
4. As Harsanyi shows, and Rawls acknowledges, if one takes expected value as the measure

of self-interest from behind the veil of ignorance, then one maximizes choice behind the veil by
choosing average utility rather than Rawls' proposal. For more on this "gambling argument,"
see JOHN c. HARSANYI, RATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND BARGAINING EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES
AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS 48-51 (1977).
5. DOUGLAS RAE ET AL., EQUALmES 12-13, 15-19 (1981).
6. Id. at 128-29.
7. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA pt. 1 (1974).
8. Lawrence Kohlberg, Justice as Reversibility, in 5 PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY
257 (Peter Laslett & James Fishkin eds., 1979).
9. Id. at 263.
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position is the paradigm case of a social contract argument. Rosenfeld
somehow believes that he can reject the category of social contract
arguments and offer us stage six methods as an alternative.
Stage six is the end point in Kohlberg's sequence of empirical
stages of moral development. 10 It consists in what Kohlberg calls
"ideal role taking" or "moral musical chairs." 11 Rosenfeld quotes this
explanation of stage six from Kohlberg:
a) The decider is to successively put himself imaginatively in the place of
each other actor and consider the claims each would make from his
point of view.
b) Where claims in one party's shoes conflict with those in another's,
imagine each party to trade places. If so, a party should drop his conflicting claim if it is based on nonrecognition of the other's point of
view. 12

Kohlberg terms this process "moral musical chairs":
Moral musical chairs means going around the circle of perspectives involved in a moral dilemma to test one's claim of right or duty until only
the equilibrated or reversible claims survive . . . . In moral chairs there is
only one "winning" chair which all other players recognize if they play
the game, the chair of the person with the prior claim of justice. 13

The key to moral musical chairs is "reversibility." As Rosenfeld
explains: "Reversibility involves not only recognizing that others have
their own perspective, but also trading positions with others to become
aware of the nature and content of their perspectives, so that each
gains a richer understanding of the other's objectives" (p. 249).
Kohlberg's proposal is a kind of multiperson version of the Golden
Rule with the proviso that the claims that are upheld are the ones that
would survive each person imaginatively switching places with all the
others affected by the choice. We imagine this process continuing until agreement emerges among all the parties.
Kohlberg gives a relatively straightforward example on which Rosenfeld also relies. 14 Kohlberg's moral reasoning studies made use of
the so-called "Heinz" dilemma, the story of a woman with a seemingly
incurable disease. A "druggist" in the same town has, however, invented a cure for which he demands an exorbitant price. Heinz, the
woman's husband, is unable to meet the druggist's demands and steals
the drug in order to save his wife's life. Kohlberg cites an interview
with an unnamed "Philosopher 3" as exemplifying stage six reasoning:
Philosopher 3 is saying "start with the Golden Rule, change places with
10. See, e.g., Lawrence Kohlberg, From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy
and Get Away with It in the Study of Moral Development, in COGNmVE DEVELOPMENT AND
EPISTEMOLOGY 151 (Theodore Mischel ed., 1971).
11. Kohlberg, supra note 8, at 262.
12. P. 249 (quoting Kohlberg, supra note 8, at 263).
13. P. 249 (quoting Kohlberg, supra note 8, at 262).
14. P. 250 (citing Kohlberg, supra note 8, at 259).
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the wife in deciding. Is your denying a duty to save the woman's life
consistent with the Golden Rule?" The wife, we may say, holds that her
right to life is higher or prior to the druggist's right to property. She
claims that the husband has a duty to steal to protect this right, since she
cannot. The druggist denies that the husband has a duty to steal the
drug and asserts he has a right to property equal to or greater than the
wife's right to life.1 5

The test is whether, when the druggist imaginatively changes
places with the wife, he can uphold the claim that the property rights
are more important than the human life:
Is the druggist's denial of the husband's duty to steal reversible? No, this
denial could not stand if he exchanged places with the wife. In the position of the druggist, he holds his right to property higher than the wife's
right to life. Presumably, however, if it were his life at stake, not the
wife's the druggist would be rational enough to prefer his right to life
over his property and would sacrifice his property. If the druggist tried
to make his conception of rights and duties reversible by imaginatively
changing places with the wife, he would give up the idea that the husband had a duty to respect his property rights and would see that the
husband had a duty towards his wife's life. 16

Kohlberg offers this as a simple paradigm case of stage six reasoning. Rosenfeld encounters more difficulty, however, when he applies
this method to his difficult case of affirmative action. Rosenfeld explicitly wants to "concentrate on the most controversial practices" (p.
47). For Rosenfeld "affirmative action shall be assumed henceforward
to include some kind of preferential treatment" (p. 47). The controversy comes in because "preferential treatment shall include the hiring
or promotion of a minority or woman over a more qualified nonminority or male" {p. 48).
Apply this kind of case to the same stage six reversibility test
Kohlberg uses for the Heinz dilemma. If a "more qualified nonminority or male" switches places in moral musical chairs with a less
qualified woman or minority male, it is hard to imagine that the
nonminority or male will come to agree that the interests of the less
qualified minority should override his interests. In the more limited
circumstance where the minority or woman applicant were an actual
victim of discrimination or came from a severely disadvantaged background, then we might be able to imagine a dialogue in which the
nonminority or male would agree, when the two switched places, to a
policy of preferential treatment. But Rosenfeld's principle is not defined in this narrow way. It yields a kind of affirmative action that
explicitly includes the most controversial cases, namely those where a
less qualified minority, regardless of class background or income tests,
is preferred over a more qualified nonminority or male. Whatever the
15. Kohlberg, supra note 8, at 261-62.
16. Id. at 262.
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merits of such a policy, it is hard to imagine it emerging consensually
from the role-switching of moral musical chairs.
At some points Rosenfeld appears to invoke group rather than individual comparisons to support such a policy. For example, he constructs a dialogue with the "Innocent White Male" who may lose out
from preferential treatment and concludes, "the more pervasive racism and sexism are in a given social setting, the more it would seem
that affirmative action could play a key role in the transition of blacks
and women from a status of inferiority to one of equality" (p. 325). If
one is concerned with the general status of one group compared to
another, then the preferential treatment argument takes on a different
force. Yet it is difficult to see how one is to square such a concern for
groups (defined by racial or gender categories) with the quite specific
apparatus of reversible reciprocity or moral musical chairs involving
individual role-switching. Rosenfeld admits as much when he adopts,
at the beginning of his book, an individualistic restriction on admissible arguments. In endorsing a general postulate of equality as a presupposition for the argument that follows, he tells us that "it is the
individual rather than the group who is entitled to such equality" (p.
4). The result is that "purely group-related justifications of affirmative
action become unacceptable" (p. 4). More specifically, "a group proportionment argument advocating affirmative action to eliminate glaring group-related imbalances in a particular workforce would have to
be rejected as inconsistent with the conviction that the individual
rather than the group is the proper subject of equality" (pp. 4-5). The
difficulty is that, within this individualistic postulate, the basis for
preferential treatment of a group, as such, becomes quite tenuous. If
Rosenfeld were to abandon his individualistic version of liberal theory,
he could get the controversial conclusion he seeks. But he seems to
want liberal individualism in theory and group preferences in practice,
somehow believing that the latter can be made to follow from the
former.
Rosenfeld introduces an additional theoretical apparatus that
might be intended to help at this point. He says Habermas' notion of
the "ideal speech situation" provides "a critical tool designed to expose communication distortions and to indicate the directions in
which a normatively oriented reconstructed dialogue relying on undistorted communication would lead" (p. 259). The idea is that some
preferences result from self-deception or false consciousness and can
be ruled out of the dialogue to which Kohlberg's reversible reciprocity
or moral musical chairs applies. "[W]hat prevents one person from
being able to appreciate the perspective of another may frequently be
traceable to differences in power and ideology or to instances of deception and self-deception" (p. 260). We are supposed to reconstruct the
relevant preferences by reference to what we would imagine being upheld in a Habermasian ideal speech situation so as to rule out these
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distortions. Rosenfeld gives the example of a black person objecting to
the justice of affirmative action:
That black participant would be the victim of self-deception, however, if
the actual reason for his claim were that he believed that because of his
superior talents the availability of affirmative action would tend to devalue his performance in the eyes of whites, thus reducing his ultimate
chances of success in a white-dominated society. [pp. 262-63]
We are not given any further explanation as to why such a conclusion would have to be the result of "self-deception." It would seem, in
fact, to be an empirical issue whether, in a particular context, affirmative action had this effect. Rosenfeld does not offer empirical evidence
on the issue. Nor does he offer the kind of counterfactual dialogue
that would give plausibility to the claim that the black man's conclusion could not be upheld in a Habermasian ideal speech situation.
Just as the basis for inferring self-deception is a bit mysterious in
this example, it is difficult to see how the conclusions of our white
male in the affirmative action dialogue should be revised. Once more,
there might be a basis for such conclusions if we were comparing
someone from an actually disadvantaged background with a privileged
white male. But when affirmative action is applied in competitive meritocratic contexts, based on racial or gender categories per se, there is
the well-known problem that comparatively well-off members of the
group will commonly be beneficiaries. 17 If such members are to be
hired even when they are less qualified (as would be required by Rosenberg's definition of preferential treatment cited above) then the
most controversial version of affirmative action would have been implemented. Once again, it is hard to see how such conclusions can
result from "reversible reciprocity" even when Habermas is invoked to
rewrite some of the preferences that can be attributed to some of the
participants.
Rosenfeld offers one other strategy for resolving such disagreements. He stipulates that when priorities among the conflicting claims
do not emerge from the reversal of perspectives test, and when the
intensity of feeling on each side of the issue is comparable, then the
issue can be resolved by utilitarian calculations as to the balances of
net preferences on the issues to be decided. He offers the example of a
municipality's deciding between a swimming pool and tennis courts.
Under these circumstances, if each resident switched places with every
other resident, they would all realize that individual preferences for a
swimming pool are no more intense than those for tennis courts. Accordingly, each resident would be justified in concluding that the preferences of others are not entitled to any greater deference than her own
preference.
17. JAMES S. FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND THE FAMILY 103·05, 121-30
(1983).
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... justice as reversibility would arguably be satisfied by a resolution
of conflicts among such claims on the basis of calculations of net preferences or net utilities. [pp. 257-58]

It is not clear why the balance of feeling about the issue should
have become a criterion for evaluating the merits of the claims or interests at stake on each side. Notorious difficulties plague the interpersonal comparison of intensities and the use of felt intensity as a
criterion of interests. 18 Rosenfeld does not air these issues but simply
stipulates this strategy. Furthermore, it is hard to see how Rosenfeld's
approach could be employed to settle the issue of preferential treatment. Both the candidate who is nonminority or male and the candidate who is minority or female or both are likely to feel equally
intensely. However, if utilitarian calculations involving everyone's
preferences were then invoked to settle the issue (in the manner Rosenfeld imagines for the swimming pool example), it is far from clear
that preferential treatment would emerge. Preferential treatment does
not enjoy widespread public support in opinion polls in this country. 19
In any case, this last strategy would render the issue dependent on the
distribution of preferences that happened to be prevalent at a given
time throughout the country. Whichever strategy Rosenfeld employs,
it hardly seems that he has provided a more determinate basis for settling this controversial issue than have rival philosophical approaches.
In particular, it seems doubtful that Rosenfeld's effort to combine
Kohlberg with Habermas can be taken, as he believes it should be, to
constitute a theoretical strategy superior to Rawls' theory of justice.
Rosenfeld objects to the Rawlsian approach becausr "the effect of the
veil of ignorance is to remove from each individual that which makes
his or her own perspective different from that of others" (p. 250). Rosenfeld concludes that behind the veil of ignorance, "the elimination of
all differences makes reversibility essentially trivial" (p. 250).
A Rawlsian might reply that the differences are eliminated in the
original position because they are held to be irrelevant from a moral
point of view. Behind the veil of ignorance I am not supposed to know
my race or my class or my I.Q. because if I did, I could tailor principles to the advantage of people with those characteristics. Because the
Kohlbergian version permits us to know about them, these differences
may upset the emergence of any consensus from the moral decision
procedure. Kohlberg has a relatively easy time when the issue is the
18. For my previous overview of the problem, see JAMES S. FlsHKIN, TYRANNY AND LEGIT20-25 (1979).
19. In the 1990 national election study, respondents were asked a carefully balanced question
that ended with "are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of blacks?" Respondents in favor numbered 237 of 1007, or 23.54%, while respondents against numbered 698 of
1007, or 69.31%. Warren E. Miller et al., American National Election Study 1990: Post-Election Survey (1991) (on computer file at Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan).
IMACY
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life of Heinz's wife versus the profits of the druggist. But the system
has more to overcome when the issue is the claim of a more qualified
nonminority versus that of a less qualified minority - the problem
Rosenfeld faces in his chosen controversial topic of preferential
treatment.
Despite these difficulties, there is the basis for an important insight
in this book: it attempts to combine dialogue among actual people
with the impartial perspectives of hypothetically rational choice. One
important strand of liberal theory, actual consent, would emphasize
real choices of real people. The actual consent of the governed binds
in the way that a promise does. But actual consent, apart from its
notorious ambiguities, 20 also has the defect that we may, sometimes
rightly, suspect the socialization and rationality that produces the consent. To take an obvious case, if citizens are brainwashed or indoctrinated, we hardly view their conclusions as morally binding or
legitimate.
By contrast, the revival of liberal theory has been based on hypothetical thought experiments that attempt to reform the biases of socialization through some impartial decision procedure. These respond
to the deficiencies in socialization and indoctrination through some
mechanism requiring an impartial perspective. Rawls' veil of ignorance is only the most celebrated example. Ackerman's neutral dialogue, 21 the perfectly sympathetic spectator of the classical
utilitarians, 22 and the gambling argument for average utility provide
some other examples. The difficulty is that these mechanisms offer
competing hypotheticals. Each offers a rival hypothetical choice procedure, but there is no actual commitment to any one of the competing
candidates and no metaprocedure for deciding among the claims of
the competing hypotheticals. They all make a putative claim to fairness or impartiality. Furthermore, as the debate between Rawls and
Harsanyi demonstrates, very slight alterations in the statement of the
assumptions can lead to radically different principles. In that case the
difference between assuming, behind the veil of ignorance, an equal
chance of being any given person, and mere uncertainty about the likelihood of being any given person is enough to support average utility
rather than maximin justice (requiring maximization of the minimum
share of primary goods). 2 3
Actual and hypothetical choice strategies each have advantages
and disadvantages in the theory of justice. If a theory were somehow
20. For a good discussion, see Hanna Pitkin, Obligation and Consent, in 4 PHILOSOPHY,
POLITICS AND SOCIETY 45, 51-62 (Peter Laslett et al. eds., 1972).
21. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
22. For a good brief discussion, see RAWLS, supra note 1, at 183-88.
23. For an extended discussion of these hypothetical choice strategies and their controversial
claim to impartiality, see JAMES s. FISHKIN, THE DIALOGUE OF JUSTICE (forthcoming 1993).
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to have the bindingness of actual commitments and the impartial character of recent hypothetical procedures, then a marriage of the two
approaches might be more powerful than either taken singly. In signifi.cant ways, this is the attraction of what Rosenfeld tries to do with
his combination of actual dialogue and impartial procedure. These
criticisms, while focused on several particulars, should not obscure the
promise of the general strategy. Actual agreements - actual choices
- should be taken as binding provided they can be insulated from
delegitimating charges that they result from coercion, brainwashing,
or indoctrination. The theory of justice needs to be brought down to
earth from imaginary thought experiments. Rosenfeld only charts a
somewhat bewildering path, but his book points in the right direction.

